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An Application of Prospect Theory:
The Effect of Trailing at Halftime
on Winning NFL Games
By Kian Sohrabi
May 1st, 2022
Macalester College
Honors Thesis

Abstract: Trailing in sports is associated with losing, but can trailing operate as a powerful
motivator that leads to winning? Based on research by Berger and Pope (2011), this study applies
Prospect Theory and loss aversion to football to test if trailing by a small margin can motivate
success. This relationship is analyzed based on teams’ point differentials at halftime since
halftime operates as a salient reference point and a time for teams to regroup and strategize.
Analysis of over 12,000 NFL games found no significant effect of trailing at halftime on the
likelihood of winning. That is, there is little evidence that Berger and Pope’s (2011) finding for a
motivational effect of losing in basketball exists in football. I offer several reasons why key
differences between football and basketball may account for the null result in football and
suggest that future research is needed in prospect theory’s application to football on a
play-by-play basis.
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I.

Introduction
Economics operates under assumptions of rationality and expected utility maximization.

While Bernoulli’s proposal of Expected Utility Theory in 1713 made great strides for the theory
of decision making under uncertainty, it is focused on the final states of outcomes as the carriers
of utility and ignores the impact of perceived gains or losses on expected utility. In 1979,
Kahneman and Tversky developed “Prospect Theory,” which argues that the carries of utility –
and thus the driver of behavior – are gains and losses from a reference point rather than final
states. For example, the utility of a 35-degree temperature is judged, not in isolation, but with
reference to recent experience; a 35-degree temperature is often judged as “good” if the
temperature the previous day was 5 degrees and “bad” if the temperature hit 55 degrees the day
before. Another key element of Prospect Theory relevant to decision making is loss aversion;
an individual's tendency to prefer avoiding losses to acquiring equivalent gains.
Prospect Theory is a powerful lens through which to understand behavior in professional
sports, a setting with competitive individuals and great financial incentives. Prospect Theory has
been applied to tennis, golf, and basketball to explore how gains and losses operate as motivators
for players. In tennis, when players are losing, they serve harder and put in more effort on the
court. In golf, when a player is putting to avoid a bad result on a hole (a bogey), they perform
better than if they are putting to get a good result at a hole (a birdie). In basketball, Berger and
Pope (2011) found that teams perform better when they are trailing by a few points at halftime.
While Prospect Theory’s perspective on decision making has been applied to numerous sports
contexts, it has not yet been applied in football.
In this study, I will use Berger and Pope’s method of analyzing the effect of trailing at
halftime on the likelihood of winning games in football. I use data from NFL games since 1966
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and employ a similar regression discontinuity method for data analysis. Berger and Pope found
that the likelihood of winning was 6 percentage points greater than expected when a team was
trailing by 1 point at halftime and 2 percentage points greater than expected when trailing by 2.
Despite the less granular nature of scoring in football (scoring happens less frequently and in
larger amounts of field goals and touchdowns), I expect to find similar results. I also intend to
explore whether the effect changes across different eras and whether fan attendance affects
teams’ performance when trailing at halftime. Since the dataset is from 1966 to 2020, I will
separate the game into different decades to compare. The 2020 season had little to no fans at
games due to the COVID-19 pandemic and this will be used as a comparison for the effect of
fans.
II. Theory
One of the earliest conceptions of rationality in economics was that people make
decisions based on expected value. For example, if a project earns $200 with a probability of
0.60 and $100 with a probability of 0.40 the expected value is $160 and a rational investor will
undertake it when the cost is less than this amount. However, in 1713, Nicolaus Bernoulli argued
against this idea and developed his conception of rational decision making under Expected
Utility Theory. This was a step forward as it introduced the idea that people make decisions
based on the expected (or weighted) utility of final states or outcomes rather than expected
outcomes. In the example from above, it is the utility of the 4200 and $100 that matter and not
the dollar amounts. Moreover, Bernoulli introduced two key principles: diminishing marginal
utility and risk aversion. The first principle means that as people have more, they find less utility
in the same gains; 5 dollars means more to a poor person than a rich person. The second
principle implies that people do not like risk and prefer to avoid it. For example, while investing
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in a stock can bring 10% gains, it could also create 50% loss and this risk leads many people to
store their money in a safe bank free of risk.
While Expected Utility Theory made improvement to how we view rationality and more
descriptive of actual behavior, it was focused on the final states of outcomes while psychologists
emphasize that humans perceive the world in terms of changes from reference points are more
driven by the potential for gains and losses in their decision making. In their path-breaking
paper in Econometrica, psychologists Kahneman and Tversky (1979) exploit this insight and
challenge conventional thinking in economics. That is, they propose a theory that runs contrary
to the rational decision-making theory in economics, which is Expected Utility Theory. What
Kahneman and Tversky propose in Prospect Theory is that the utility and disutility of gains and
losses guide human decision making, not the utility of final states of outcomes. A common
example of this is how we perceive the weather. In Minnesota, a notoriously cold state, when it
hits 32 degrees Fahrenheit in the fall, many perceive this as a loss. Accustomed to sunny walks
in beautiful weather, a 32-degree day is a loss of value for many individuals. On the other hand, a
32-degree day in the spring is welcome as people drop their winter coats for cozy sweaters. The
change from below freezing to freezing is a gain in our environmental circumstance. The two
outcomes are the same, it is a 32-degree Fahrenheit day in both situations, but how we perceive
them is completely different.
According to Kahneman and Tversky, our perceptions of gains and losses are modeled by
four key components in Prospect Theory: reference points, loss aversion, diminishing sensitivity
and nonlinear weighting of probability. These are illustrated in Figure 1.
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Figure 1: Prospect Theory (proposed by Kahneman & Tversky) Figure 2: Prospect Theory (proposed in Football)

Reference points serve as a key driver of our perception of gains and losses. There are
three key determinants of a reference point: the status quo, the expected outcome and the entitled
outcome. Based on what a situation usually is, what one thinks its outcome will be and what one
wants the outcome to be, people will form a reference point. If the actual outcome is greater than
the reference point, people view it as a gain and it creates value. If it's less than the reference
point, it's viewed as a loss and creates negative value. This can be seen in an everyday situation
such as test scores. If a student consistently studies a lot and gets As, their status quo and
expected outcome all indicate an A as their reference point for an exam. If this student gets a B
on an exam, this is viewed as a major loss. They were not expecting this and due to their
reference point dependence, they have incurred a loss in value. On the other hand, if a student
doesn’t study much and consistently gets Cs, the reference is a C for their exam grade. If this
student gets a B, this is viewed as a major gain in value. Value does not come from the final
outcome, but how we perceive this outcome as a gain or loss relative to a reference point.
The second tenant of Prospect Theory is Loss Aversion, which states that not only do
people dislike losses but that they dislike them more than they like gains of an equivalent
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magnitude. This is seen in Figure 1 as a steeper value function in the loss domain than in the gain
domain. This feature is often argued as an evolutionary component of human behavior. Survival
for early humans may have produced an evolutionary adaptation of loss aversion as those who
weren’t loss averse were more likely to put themselves in risky situations, which resulted in their
death. Nowadays, loss aversion might be less necessary for our survival, but remains a key
component of our daily decision making. The fear of loss can push many people away from
investing or refusing to sell a stock that has lost value, since selling the stock would actualize the
loss in one’s mind. The refusal to sell has become a notorious slogan for members of the Wall
Street Bets subreddit, in which they claim only beta males sell their stocks for a loss and that true
alphas (or “Chads”) hold their stocks until they hit the moon.
Loss Aversion does not just mean that people don’t like losses, but that losses can operate
as a more powerful motivator than gains. This can be seen in golf, in which it has been shown
that PGA golfers perform better when they are attempting to avoid finishing a round poorly
compared to when they are trying to finish a round strongly (Pope & Schweitzer, 2011). This is
even seen in the highest performers who have major fiscal incentives to finish rounds strongly,
but the stronger motivator is still loss aversion. Studies have shown that the psychological effect
of losing is about two to four times as powerful as gaining.
Prospect Theory’s third tenant is that there are diminishing returns from gains and losses,
meaning that as a gain or loss increases, the change in value from each unit is less strong than the
previous unit. This is seen in Figure 1 as the concavity of the value function in the gains domain
and its convexity in the loss domain. Similar to gaining light in a dark room (or increasing the
brightness of your computer), the initial increase— or decrease— from 0 has the biggest effect.
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Everything following it has a decreasingly strong effect. This is similar to the concept of
diminishing marginal returns in Expected Utility Theory.
A fourth principle of Prospect Theory is the nonlinear weighting of probability. This is
seen in Figure 3. The dashed lines show the one-to-one correspondence between the weights and
probabilities assumed in expected utility theory and the S-shaped function illustrates what is
implied in Prospect Theory. The latter holds that people do not weigh the utility of an outcome
in direct proportion to its likelihood. People overweight low probabilities and underweight high
probabilities. This is due to two effects, the possibility effect and the certainty effect. The
possibility that something may happen creates a value for people and this causes low
probabilities to be overvalued, which is seen in common examples like buying a lottery ticket.
Buying a lottery ticket creates negative value in expected utility, but the possibility of winning
grand prizes is valuable to people and the nonlinear weighting of potential gain makes the
transaction worthwhile for most people. On the other hand, the certainty effect says that people
value knowing exactly what to expect in an outcome. This is why at the high levels of probability
people do not value the probabilities as highly as they should since they are not certain the
outcome will occur.
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Figure 3: Nonlinear weighting of Probability

In this paper, I hypothesize that NFL players experience a unique version of the Prospect
Theory value function. They experience all the previously mentioned principles of Prospect
Theory, but with a discontinuous jump from a loss by 1 to 0 (tie) and from 0 to a gain of 1 (both
depicted above in Figure 2). Since halftime operates as a salient reference point for teams to
regroup and focus on their objectives, I argue the potential for this massive gain in value will be
seen in teams performing better than expected when trailing by small margins at halftime.

III. Literature Review
“If it doesn’t matter who wins or loses, why do they keep score?”
-

Vince Lombardi
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One would expect that leading throughout games should lead to victories. Cooper,
Deneve and Mosteller (1992) found that when teams are ahead early in sports, they win about
two-thirds of the time. Hal Stern (1994) developed a model for projecting victories from
intermediate points of games in the National Basketball Association (NBA) and the National
League of Major League Baseball (MLB). He found leading by greater amounts and leading later
in games each steer teams towards victory and that this relationship was similar in both leagues.
It logically follows that leading in games leads to an increased probability of winning, but are
there situations where trailing in a game can lead to winning?
As discussed in the previous section, Prospect Theory’s main tenets are reference
dependence, loss aversion and diminishing sensitivity. Reference dependence states that people
do not make decisions based on outcome, but on how the outcome relates to a reference point
(Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). A reference point is formed by the status quo, the expected
outcome and the outcome to which one feels entitled. If the actual outcome is greater than the
reference point, individuals gain value from it. If the actual outcome is less than its reference
point, individuals will lose value from it. For example, one common reference point that most
people have are goals. People create goals for how they want things to pan out and judge their
experiences or outcomes in reference to these goals (Heath, Larrick & Wu, 1999). For example,
in football, a team’s goal is victory and losing during a game creates negative value that they
strive to avoid. That, a tied score is the highly salient reference point in football with winning
producing positive and losing negative utility.
The next key principle is loss aversion. Loss aversion says that not only do people dislike
losing, but they dislike it more than they actually enjoy gaining or winning. While gains can be
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enticing and a good motivator, it has also been found that people’s aversion to losing can operate
as a more powerful motivator (Berger & Pope, 2011). Research shows that people dislike losses
two to four times as much as they enjoy gains, but this can vary depending on the context
(Tversky & Kahneman, 1992; Heath, Larrick & Wu, 1999). Loss aversion can also interplay with
other factors to affect outcomes. A study of the effect of loss aversion and the frequent
evaluation of outcomes (myopic loss aversion), showed that those who received the most
frequent feedback took the least risk and gained the least amount of money (Thaleer, Tversky,
Kahneman, & Schwartz, 1997). As people repeatedly check the outcome possibilities, their
tendency for loss aversion will kick in and they will withdraw from risks to avoid loss.
Furthermore, people experience diminishing sensitivity to their gains and losses. In
football, this suggests losing by a point is extremely distasteful and losing by two points is even
more distasteful, but it is not twice as distasteful. As gains increase, the value people garner from
the marginal increase in gains decreases. In football, this can be seen in victory margins. The
more a team wins by, the less value they would receive from an additional point in their margin
of victory— winning by 47 instead of 41 creates much less value than winning by 7 instead of 1.
Golf provides an important setting to test Prospect Theory. Pope and Schweitzer (2011)
looked at professional golfers’ performance during the PGA tour and analyzed over 2.5 million
putts. In golf, athletes are judged and ranked by their total strokes for an 18-hole course. As
golfers progress through a course, the par for each hole is a salient reference point for how a
golfer is performing. Thus, golfers will consistently be in situations where they will be putting to
be under-par, at par, or over-par; these can otherwise be known as a gain, met expectations or
loss. Pope and Schweitzer find that, holding all else constant, PGA golfers were less likely to
make a putt if they were going for under-par (a gain) than if they were trying to avoid over-par (a
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loss). For example, Birdie putts—a putt that puts a golfer one stroke under par— were less likely
to be made than par putts by two percentage points. This indicates that golfers are more
motivated by avoiding the loss domain than entering the gain domain and shows how loss
aversion can operate as a strong motivator. Furthermore, this was found to be true even in the top
athletes’ performance, such as Tiger Woods and Phil Mickelson. These top golfers have major
financial incentives to perform at their best in every moment as thousands, if not millions, of
dollars are on the line for them, but even they exhibit the same loss aversion motivation that we
see in all golfers.
Anbarci, Arin, Okten and Zenker (2017) looked at the application of Prospect Theory in
professional tennis. They found that players put more effort into their serve when they are behind
than when they are ahead. Male players increase their serve speed by 1.64 miles per hour when
they are losing mid-set. They also found that as the difference in score1 increases, players’
responses in serve speed and effort levels are smaller, reflecting diminishing sensitivity to loss.
Additionally, players were more risk averse in the domain of gains than in the domain of losses.
These findings all support key components of Prospect Theory, loss aversion and diminishing
sensitivity. Anbarci et al. also found evidence that these effects are more pronounced in men than
in women, which is interesting for the NFL as it is exclusively male.
Markle, Wu, White and Sackett (2018) found evidence of loss aversion and diminishing
sensitivity in marathon runners in the relationship between their satisfaction with their
performance relative to their goal. Bernardi and Cozzani (2021) studied the effect of local soccer
teams experiencing an unexpected loss and discovered it led to a decrease in the number of births
nine months later. They argue that this is because the unexpected loss (unlike expected losses)

1

Score was looked at as point score, game score and set score in this study.
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operates as a loss in value for individuals and this decrease in happiness leads to less
reproduction.
In basketball, Berger and Pope (2011) explored the effect of trailing at halftime on
winning NBA games. Based on previous research, they suggested that losing by a small amount
at halftime could actually increase motivation and lead to winning. Berger and Pope focused on
halftime for a couple reasons. Halftime provides feedback which helps people adjust their effort
to meet their goals. Also, the break invites all players to be salient of their relative position and
teams get the opportunity to regroup and work towards their goal. Using a regression
discontinuity method, Pope and Berger found that when teams were trailing by one or two
points, they had a higher winning percentage than expected by six and two percentage points
respectively (shown in Figure 4). In fact, when home teams were trailing by one point, they were
expected to win more often than home teams that were leading by one were expected to win.
They claimed that teams that were losing at halftime won by about 6.5 percentage points more
than expected. They concluded that their findings show how even experienced professionals will
follow a nontraditional expectation of behavior.
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Figure 4: Berger and Pope’s (2011) finding about the effect of trailing at halftime on winning NBA games

Teeselink et al. (2020) followed Berger and Pope (2011) by using a regression
discontinuity analysis to look at four sports and see how trailing at halftime affected game
outcomes. Among Australian football, American football, basketball and rugby, they found little
to no effect of trailing at halftime on the outcome of games. However, they included insufficient
control variables relative to Berger and Pope’s study. The most notable one being the season
winning percentage to account for team quality and also the effect of coaching ability via coach
winning percentage.
Furthermore, the differences in play throughout history can be analyzed further. Most
sports in the modern era are increasingly high scoring because it is believed that this will help
draw viewer attention to games. This higher scoring could change how teams would view a
halftime deficit.
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In this study, I aim to utilize Berger and Pope’s (2011) method to test “Can Losing lead to
Winning?” in NFL games. I will use their regression discontinuity approach and analyze game
level outcomes for 12,455 games between 1966 and 2020. 1966 is considered the beginning of
the modern football era since the sport’s premier teams were all operating under a unified league.
Additionally, I will investigate whether the effect of halftime can be seen differently in different
decades or eras of football. Unlike the game today that is much more pass happy and scoring
centric, football of the 1970s and 80s was notoriously brutal and defense heavy, which makes
coming back from a deficit much harder. I also plan to look at how the lack of fan attendance
affected home team performance in the 2020 season, which was played under COVID-19
restrictions. This data provides a very interesting natural experiment with the removal of fans
while holding most of the football game process as it was previously.
Data Description
This study is based on NFL game data that was collected from Stathead, a site that
specializes in game statistics for major American sports leagues. Stathead has game data going
back until the 1940s, but this study will restrict the dataset from 1966 to 2020. Most NFL
statistics and records are tracked from 1966 since it was the first time the sport’s best teams all
operated under a unified league. 2020 was the last completed season of football at the time of
this writing and will thus be the last season used in the analysis.
Table 1 describes the key variable for this dataset: the halftime margin. My data set
covers 24,910 games and, on average, the home (away) team was leading (losing) by 1.77 points
at halftime. The largest number of points the home (away) team was behind at halftime was 38
(45) points. It follows then that the largest number of points the home (away) team was ahead at
halftime was 45 (38) points.
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Table 1
Descriptive Statistics: Halftime Margins
(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

VARIABLES

N

Mean

Std. err.

Min

Max

Halftime
Margin (All)

24,910

0

11.24

-45

45

Halftime
Margin
(Home)

12,455

1.77

11.10

-38

45

Halftime
Margin (Away)

12,455

-1.77

11.10

-45

38

Table 1: Depicts descriptive measures for the key variable of halftime margin. Row 1 (All) shows all observations
(every NFL game from 1966 to 2020 from both the home and away perspective) and its mean of 0 indicates that the
data has been collected correctly. This is further confirmed by Row 2 (Home) and Row 3 (Away) having perfectly
inverse results between each other.

Table 2 shows summary statistics for historical win frequency for home teams that are
tied at halftime (M=0.56, SD=0.02), winning by 1 at halftime (M=0.58, SD=0.03) and losing by 1
at halftime (M=0.48, SD=0.03). The home team was tied at halftime in 1,078 games and won
55.66 percent of these. The fact that this win percentage is greater than 50 percent reflects the
advantage to playing at home. The home team was ahead (behind) by one point at halftime in
240 (231) games and won 58.13 (48.48) percent of these. Relative to the case of being tied,
losing by one at halftime has a much larger negative marginal impact on the winning percentage
(from 55.66 to 48.48 percent) than does winning by one at halftime (from 55.66 to 58.13
percent).
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Table 2
Descriptive Statistics: Home Team Win Percentages
VARIABLES

(1)
N

(2)
Mean

(3)
Std. err.

(4)
[95% conf.

(5)
interval]

Outcome (+0)

1,078

.5566

.0150

.5271

.5861

Outcome (+1)

240

.5813

.0132

.5185

.6440

Outcome (-1)

231

.4848

.0330

.4199

.5498

Table 2: These results show the likelihood of winning at different halftime margins (around 0) for home teams. The
likelihood of the home team winning when the game is tied at halftime is 55%. When home teams are losing by 1
point, it is 48% and 56% when they are winning by 1 point at halftime. (Evidence from Pope and Berger suggests
that the -likelihood of winning at -1 should be greater than the 1 likelihood of winning at +1)

Figure 5 shows the relationship between winning percentage and the point margin at halftime.
For example, the home teams won 38 percent of their games when down by 5 points at halftime
and 62 percent of their games when up by 5 points at halftime. While this graph is just a
visualization of the data and doesn’t incorporate data analysis, one can still see that it presents a
distribution indicating a positive linear relationship between likelihood of winning and halftime
margin, between halftime margin values of -10 and 10. In Figure 4, from Berger and Pope
(2011), we can see that teams’ likelihood of winning increases in the loss domain until 0, and
then there is a significant drop off after the 0 point, suggesting that trailing was operating as a
powerful motivator for teams to win.
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Figure 5: The probability of the home team winning the game at halftime margins between -10 and +10; +2 seems to
stand out as an outlier, but this is likely due to its small sample size

Empirical Strategy
Since this dataset includes both home and away team perspectives in every game score,
the analysis will look at home teams exclusively for consistency. These findings will be
compared to the results of the same method but using away teams and these two analyses should
have exactly opposite results.
I use the Regression Discontinuity (RD) method to test for causality running from the
halftime margin to the likelihood of winning the game. RD designs are typically used when an
independent variable’s treatment status is determined by its relation to a threshold. In this study,
the independent variable is halftime margin and its threshold is having a negative margin at
halftime. This can also be thought of as being interested in how teams react when they are being
“treated” with losing at halftime. In the context of Figure 5, we expect a positive relationship
17

between the horizontal and vertical axis variables, and test whether this relationship differs when
the team is behind at halftime compared to when they are ahead. For example, Berger and Pope
(2011) found that there is an upward shift in win probability for home teams that are behind at
halftime and use this to conclude that loss aversion causes losing teams to try harder.
The regression discontinuity model for this study is a modified logistic model. It is
specified as

wini =β0 + β1([losing at halftime])+ β2(margin at halftime) + β3Xi + εi

in which wini is an indicator equal to 1 if the home team won the game i, 0 if the home team lost
game i. The second key variable is losing at halftimei, an indicator equal to 1 if the home team
was trailing at halftime in game i and 0 if the home team was winning at halftime in game i. The
third key variable is margin at halftimei is the independent (or “forcing”) variable of the
regression discontinuity model. This is the variable shown on the horizontal axis of Figure 5. Xi
represents the control variables for each game. Control variables I consider include the season
winning percentage for home and away teams. This is done to ensure that the quality of teams is
accounted for in the analysis. The error term represents the difference between the predicted
outcomes of the model and the actual observed outcomes of the data.
This RD model aims to see if, when inducing a possible discontinuity at 0, teams perform
significantly differently when they are losing than when they are winning. By comparing these
two states, we can see the treatment effect of losing. The key coefficient in this model is β1 as it
indicates the effect of trailing on winning. The hypothesis of this study is that if trailing at
halftime does not affect performance, we will see a smooth, continuous regression line
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throughout the data, but if trailing positively affects the likelihood of winning, this will be shown
through the β1 > 0 and we will see an upward shift in the regression line prior to the
discontinuity at 0.
Results
The data was analyzed using the aforementioned strategy and employed four main
regressions and the results are shown in Table 3. Columns (1) and (3) look at halftime margin
linearly and columns (2) and (4) include a cubic function of halftime margin. Columns (1) and
(2) introduce no controls while columns (3) and (4) control for the home team’s win percentage
and the away team’s win percentage.
As indicated by the Pseudo R-squareds, the models explain between 31 and 35 percent of
the variation in the dependent variable: the win-lose binary variable. As columns 3 and 4 show,
about four more percentage points of variation is explained when the home and away team
winning percentages are included. The Pseudo R-squareds indicate that allowing for a cubic
relationship between the halftime margin and the likelihood of winning does not improve the fit
of the model.
Most importantly, across all four specifications, we find no statistically significant
relationship between trailing at halftime and the likelihood of winning. This is seen in the top
row off Table 3 where all the coefficients are not significantly different from zero. Only one of
the four coefficients is positive as predicted based on Berger and Pope’s findings and the
t-statistic indicates we cannot infer that it is different from zero at the 5 percent level.
Additionally, the standard error is also at its lowest in column (SE=0.01), and varies between
values of 0.07 (for column 3) and 0.11 (for columns 2 and 4).
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Table 3
The Impact of Trailing at Halftime on Winning
(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

0.02
(0.01)

-0.03
(0.11)

0.00
(0.07)

-0.04
(0.11)

Home Team
Win Percentage

-0.95
(0.10)

2.25
(0.13)

Away Team
Win Percentage

1.27
(0.10)

-2.30
(0.13)

X

X

Trailing at
Halftime

Halftime Margin
(Linear)

X

Halftime Margin
(Cubic)

X
X

X

Pseudo R2

0.31

0.31

0.35

0.35

Observations

11,377

11,377

11,377

11,377

Table 3: Logistic regression results from linear logit without controls (1), a cubic logit without controls (2), a linear
logit with controls (3) and cubic logit with controls (4).

The results in Table 4 provide further description of the results of column 3, which
includes a linear fit of the halftime margin and control variables for home and away team win
percentages. The results show that there are statistically significant relationships between the
halftime margin (p<0.01), home team win percentage (p<0.01), and away team win percentage
(p<0.01). However, as discussed above, trailing at halftime (p=0.97) has a very high p-value.
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Table 4
The Impact of Trailing at Halftime on Winning
(1)
Coefficient

(2)
Std. Error

(3)
p-value

(4)
[95% conf.

(5)
interval]

Constant

0.28

0.10

.01***

0.08

0 .48

Trailing at
Halftime

0.00

0.09

.97

-0.18

0.17

Halftime Margin 0.15

0.01

<.01***

0.14

0.16

Away Team
Win Percentage

-2.31

0.13

<.01***

-2.56

-2.05

Home Team
Win Percentage

2.25

0.13

<.01***

1.99

2.5

Table 4: Full results and values from Column 3— linear logistic regression with controls to predict the likelihood of
winning a game.

To explore whether there are possible threshold effects during the game, I also
investigated the end of the third quarter. The rationale for this is that prospect theory proposes
that teams will work harder to enter the gains domain when they are in the loss domain. The third
quarter is a more specific context of after halftime than the entire second half and looking at this
shorter after halftime period allows us to find any insights that are lost in teams’ adjustments to
the fourth quarter, which some argue can be considered its own game in a vacuum since it is the
last and most critical part of a game. analysis was also executed on teams’ likelihoods to win the
third quarter to isolate an effect closer to halftime.
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The results are shown in Table 5. Trailing at halftime still had statistically insignificant
results (p=0.48), while away team (p<0.01) and home team win percentages (p<0.01) still had
statistically significant effects. However, halftime margin (p=0.54) no longer had a statistically
significant effect.

Table 5
The Impact of Losing at Halftime on Winning the Third Quarter
(1)
Coefficient

(2)
Std. Error

(3)
p-value

(4)
[95% conf.

(5)
interval]

Constant

-0.68

0.00

<.01***

-0.84

-0.53

Trailing at
Halftime

-.05

0.07

.48

-0.19

0.09

Halftime
Margin

0.00

0.00

.54

-0.01

0.00

Away Team
Win Percentage

1.27

0.10

<.01***

1.07

1.47

Home Team
Win Percentage

-0.95

0.10

<.01***

-1.15

-0.75

Table 5: Same logistic regression method as Table 4 (includes controls and has a linear relationship), but instead
predicting the likelihood of the home team outscoring their opponent in the third quarter.

The analysis methods used to look at the outcomes and who wins the third quarter of
NFL games was also applied exclusively to the 2020 NFL season, which was affected by the
COVID-19 pandemic and had minimal fans at home games. Trailing at halftime (p=0.24) did not
affect teams’ likelihood of winning games during the pandemic, nor did it affect their likelihood
of winning the third quarter (p=0.24)
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While there still are statistically significant effects for home(p<0.01) and away team win
percentages (p<0.01) in winning games, there is no significant effect on winning the third quarter
during the pandemic for home teams (p=0.62) or away teams (p=0.24).
Table 6
The Impact of Losing at Halftime on Winning in the COVID-19 affected season
(1)
Coefficient

(2)
Std. Error

(3)
p-value

(4)
[95% conf.

(5)
interval]

Constant

0.70

0.70

0.31

-.66

2.07

Trailing at
Halftime

-0.73

0.62

0.24

-1.96

0.49

Halftime
Margin

0.12

0.04

<0.01***

0.05

0.19

Away Team
Win Percentage

-3.02

0.86

<0.01***

-4.718

-1.33

Home Team
Win Percentage

2.37

0.86

0.01***

0.69

4.05

Table 6: Logistic regression results from a linear logit with controls that predicts the likelihood of the home team
winning a game, exclusively in the 2020 season affected by the COVID-19 pandemic

Table 7
The Impact of Losing at Halftime on Winning the Third Quarter in the COVID-19 affected
season
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(1)
Coefficient

(2)
Std. Error

(3)
p-value

(4)
[95% conf.

(5)
interval]

Constant

-0.30

0.54

0.57

-1.36

0.75

Trailing at
Halftime

-0.34

0.48

0.48

-1.28

0.60

-0.01

0.02

0.78

-0.05

0.04

Away Team
Win Percentage 0.73

0.62

0.24

-0.49

1.95

Home Team
Win Percentage -0.32

0.63

0.62

-1.56

0.93

Halftime
Margin

Table 7: Logistic regression results from a linear logit with controls that predicts the likelihood of the home team
outscoring their opponent in the third quarter, exclusively in the 2020 season affected by the COVID-19 pandemic

Discussion
Does trailing at halftime lead to winning? The evidence presented above for the National
Football League suggests that it does not. Being a better team or playing inferior opponents leads
to winning and how much one is losing at halftime predicts the likelihood of a victory, but these
are both intuitively expected results. Contrary to the predictions of prospect theory, NFL teams
are no more likely to win when they are losing at halftime.
There is evidence of prospect theory’s validity in applications to sports; basketball, tennis
and golf have all had significant findings under analysis guided by prospect theory. Why do we
not see this in the NFL? One main reason could be the lumpier nature of NFL scoring.
Basketball, golf and tennis all reward success with points frequently and on a small scale.
Basketball uses ones, twos and threes. Golf uses ones and tennis, although they label them as 10
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or 15 points, uses one real point. In football, however, teams are generally rewarded for success
over the course of many plays in point groupings of threes and sevens. This means that, even if a
team is increasingly motivated by trailing at halftime, they will have a difficult time representing
this on the scoreboard. It takes longer to score in the NFL and, if a team does score, their
progress is immediately reflected on the scoreboard and it is unlikely that they will score again
quickly. This can also give the other team time to reassess their situation and become more
motivated because now they are under greater threat to lose.
Football also has the increased importance of possession, in which the ball is given to the
other side far less commonly than in basketball, tennis or golf. In golf, players actually never
give up possession and are in control of their game the entire time. In football, when a team has
possession, they are at a strong advantage because the opponent usually won’t get an opportunity
to score for a few minutes, and in the other aforementioned sports it could take a few seconds.
Thus, data about whether the home team receives the ball after halftime would be greatly
beneficial to future research.
Future research would greatly benefit from looking at play-by-play data to assess
applications of prospect theory to football. How do defenses perform after an interception? How
do offenses perform after falling behind in the 4th quarter? Or how does a quarterback perform
after getting sacked? After entering the loss domain in these settings, are players or teams any
more likely to enter the gains domain?
Overall, this study shows that prospect theory does not have significant effects when
applied to halftime of NFL games. However, this does not mean that prospect theory does not
have applications to football. Research in other sports has shown that it can consistently be
applied in settings where players are consistently able to impact their outcomes in small point
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groupings. Future research in prospect theory’s application to football would greatly benefit from
delving into smaller scale analysis of NFL games.
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